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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 20060324-CA
COREY EVAN VONBERG
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT VONBERG

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter. Jurisdiction originated
in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(i) (1953, as
amended), in that it is a conviction of a charge for a first degree felony. However, by
order of the Utah Supreme Court, dated the 10th day of April, 2006, pursuant to Rule 44,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and authorized by Utah Code Annotated Section 782-2(4) (1953, as amended), the matter was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals.
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court erred in not allowing defense counsel to inquire
about a fifteen-year-old felony conviction during the cross-examination of
a State witness?
The trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence in its

determination which typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of
discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See State v. Comer,
1

2002 UT App. 219, fl 1, 51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,^[20, 989 P.2d
52), cert denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). Whether testimony is omitted in violation of a
defendant's right to confrontation is a question of law that is viewed for correctness. See
State v. Callihan, 2000 UT 87, Tf31, 57 P.3d 222. Where issues on appeal present
questions of statutory interpretation, the proper interpretation of the statute is a question
of law and reviewed for correctness. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, \\1,
977, P.2d 1201. The Court of Appeals accords no deference to the legal conclusions of
the trial court, but reviews them for correctness. See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^|8, 20
P.3d 300. In State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court made
it clear that while as a matter of law certain categories of evidence are presumptively
unfairly prejudicial, the trial court is the one primarily responsible for making the
evaluation of whether the proponent of the evidence has overcome that presumption.
Issues sounding in due process require that an accused receive a trial before a fair and
impartial jury, free from outside influences. See State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1448
(Utah 1977), rehearing denied, 576 P.2d 857 (Utah 1978), cert denied, 4439 U.S. 882, 99
S.Ct. 219 58 L.Ed. P.2d 194 (1978); Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639,
1643, 6 L.Ed. P.2d 751, 775 (1961). This issue was preserved in the trial court (R. 240:
256-65).
II.

Whether the Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial or
sentencing?
Where representation falls below the standard objective of a reasonable

professional, sufficiently to overcome the presumption that counsel rendered adequate

2

assistance and exercised sound professional judgment and when a case demonstrates that
counsels error was prejudicial, the representation is ineffective when there is a
reasonable probability that but for such error the outcome in the proceedings would have
been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065,
80 L.Ed. 2d 64 (1985). The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted this to mean that the
Defendant must show that his counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and .. . counsel's deficient
performance prejudiced him." State v. Hernandez, 2005 UT App 546, ^f 17, 128 P.3d 556
(internal quotation marks omitted). An ineffective assistance of counsel claimed raised
for the first time on appeal raises a question of law which the appellate court reviews for
correctness. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ^[6, 89 P.3d 162.
III.

Whether the disclosure of Appellant being homosexual or the failure to
consider Appellant for probation under Utah Code Section 76-5-406.5
constituted manifest injustice.

"[I]n most circumstances the term 'manifest injustice' is synonymous with the
'plain error' standard

" State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, f 40, 82 P.3d 1106 (quoting State

v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989). To establish plain error, a defendant must
show that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (iii) the error is harmful." Id. ^ 41 (quoting State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1031
(Utah 1994)). This issue was not preserved in the trial court but is properly reviewed by
this Court because it constitutes plain error. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45, 114
P.3d551.

3

STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
The following statutory provisions and rules are relevant to this appeal and are
attached as Addendum A:
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(i) (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(4) (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-406.5 (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-403.1 (1953, as amended)
Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 19(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is a criminal case in which the Appellant was convicted of four (4) counts of
forcible sodomy on a child, each a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated, Section 76-5-403.1 (1953, as amended). The convictions resulted from
circumstances that allegedly occurred between August 18,2003 and August 21,2003, in
Iron County, State of Utah. The specific acts in question, to which the victim testified,
involved fellatio, first performed upon him, and then the victim reciprocating by
performing the same upon the Appellant, on August 18, 2003 and again on August 21,
2003. There was one additional offense alleged by the State in its amended information
which was dismissed after evidence came in. The Appellant retained counsel for trial.
Subsequent to trial but before sentencing, new counsel substituted in and later withdrew.
A new attorney was appointed by the trial court before sentencing.
At trial and during voir dire, each potential juror was questioned in chambers
4

about Defendant's homosexuality. No objection was made of this questioning, the
Appellant did not testify at trial and counsel for the Defendant did not move for a new
trial at any time during the proceedings.
At sentencing, appointed counsel did not take into consideration the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-406.5 (1953, as amended). Additionally, neither
the State nor the trial court judge considered the application of section 76-5-406.5. The
Appellant was sentenced after the trial court judge considered the factors presented for
mitigation and aggravation. He reached what might be considered a compromise in
sentencing the Appellant to the minimum mandatory for counts I and II, to run concurrent
to each other, but consecutive to counts IV and V, which also ran concurrent to each
other, each for the minimum often (10) years to life. While it appears from the record
and transcript that the failure to consider section 76-5-406.5 was an oversight by all
parties, the record is adequate in showing the Appellant qualified for consideration.
Additionally, Counsel for Appellant should have moved for mistrial once the State
moved to dismiss count III. The jury had been tainted by information no longer relevant
to the charges. From the totality of circumstances, due process and fundamental fairness
required retrial.
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition
The charges arise from the reciprocal unlawful sexual contact that arose on August
18,2003 and August 21, 2003. However, the matter was not reported or disclosed until
November, 2003. The Appellant was arrested and initially appeared in January, 2004.
The preliminary hearing was waived and the Appellant was arraigned in March of 2004.
5

The matter came on several times for status and was reviewed on a motion in limine
brought by the State the day before trial. The trial commenced September 22? 2005, and
concluded the following day. A substitution of counsel was made and successor counsel
moved to withdraw in February, 2006. The Appellant was appointed counsel and later
sentenced on March 14, 2006. On or about March 24, 2006, the Fifth Judicial District
Court entered its Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, committing Appellant to serve
four (4) minimum, mandatory life sentences: Counts I and II, to run concurrent with each
other, counts IV and V to run concurrent with each other, the two groups of concurrent
sentences to run consecutive to one another (R. 265-269; see also Addendum B). Bryan
Jackson was appointed to handle the appeal and notice of appeal was filed on the 3rd day
of April, 2006, together with a request for transcripts. Following this Court's remand to
the trial court, Bryan Jackson was removed as appellate counsel because of a possible
future conflict and Jack B. Burns was appointed as substitute counsel and filed a notice of
appearance on August 30, 2007.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. In August, 2003, the victim, a 13 year old boy, was living with his mother,
two older sisters and VALERIE VONBERG. Ms. VONBERG was his mother's
significant other in a same sex relationship. The Appellant is VALERIE VONBERG?s
brother. That year the Appellant came from his home in Idaho to Iron County, Utah,
where he put up shelves, did painting and made general household repairs (R. 239: 160;
see also Addendum C). Appellant was there for about a month. The victim was living
with his father for the summer until about three (3) weeks before school started. Id.
6

2. The last few days before school, sometime between August 18 and August 21,
2003, the victim asked his mother if it was okay for him to sleep in the tent where the
Appellant had been staying and received her okay to do so (R. 239: 209-210; see also
Addendum C).
3. Some months later on Thanksgiving weekend, in November, the victim's
biological father, PAUL BOTTOMA, approached his son regarding his concern about
internet sites that had been accessed on the home computer, which were characterized by
the father as pornographic sites, which lead to the victim disclosing that he had been
abused by the Appellant (R. 239: 199; see also Addendum C).
4. This was reported and further investigation revealed that on November 4, 2003,
the victim had made journal entries writing that he was sexually abused in a different
manner and in a different location than the victim testified to. When asked to explain, the
victim stated that he thought he was "frustrated and wanted to make it sound worse than
it did (sic).1' (R. 239: 172; see also Addendum C). His entries made reference to bruises
and when asked on cross-examination if the Appellant had acted in the way the victim
described in his journal; in other words, "thrown down," "bruised," or "threatened," the
victim stated, "no" or he did not remember (R. 239: 177-178; see also Addendum C).
When asked why he would write such a thing, the victim responded, "I don't know. I
think I was frustrated and wanted the attention, I guess." Id.
5. A computer forensic expert testified that he received instructions to make a
search of a Dell desktop computer to look for images of a pornographic nature and
website visits of the same nature between the dates of August 1, 2003, and November 30,
7

2003. He testified that the only thing he had found on the computer was that there was an
internet base during that period of time with six e-mails that were sent and received, none
of which had the content that he was instructed to look for. There was no other internet
usage at all (R. 239: 216-217; see also Addendum C).
6. The computer expert stated that he had examined a second computer, which was
a generic desktop PC, with the same instructive search for the same period of time, and
found that there were one thousand, five hundred and sixty-three (1,563) websites that
had been visited over that period, with one hundred and ninety (190) e-mails that were
sent or received and they recovered two thousand, nine hundred and sixteen (2,916)
deleted graphic files (R. 239: 217; see Addendum C), but someone had actually gone a
step further to try to permanently delete what was pulled up in November, 2003 (R. 239:
221; see also Addendum C). The end result was that no pornographic material was
discovered that was made a part of the record.
7. Officer JIM GARNER testified at trial that he interviewed the Appellant when
he was arrested in January of 2004, and the Appellant told him that while "sleeping out
there [in the tent] he shared part of his sleeping bag with the victim11 (R. 239: 226; see
also Addendum C). The investigator stated that the Appellant denied any other contact
with the victim other than with their eyes. Id.
8. At trial, the victim testified of two (2) incidences involving reciprocal contact
in the form of fellatio. The one occurred on or about the 18th day and the other on the 21 s
day of August, 2003, in the tent where Appellant was staying (R. 239: 165, 167-168; see
also Addendum C).
8

9. The victim also testified about an intervening event while hiking to the city's
water tanks where he and the Appellant allegedly masturbated each other. Such activities
did not meet the additional charge of sodomy, Count III in the Amended information. At
the end of the evidence, the State moved to dismiss the additional charge of sodomy.
Defense counsel made no motion for mistrial and should have on grounds which would
have included the fact that the jury was now tainted by information of bad acts not
relevant to the pending charges. That is to say, what appears at first blush as being the
appropriate call to dismiss the charge since no additional evidence was submitted,
because of the manner in which the evidence was presented, the jurors were exposed to
evidence not necessarily relevant to the charges or if considered relevant then highly
prejudicial. The jury was neither instructed nor informed to disregard this evidence.
10. At trial, State's witness, SHAWN ROBERT KEITH, testified that Appellant
took him into his confidence and admitted to having oral sex with the victim, stating that
it was partly his [the victim's] fault that he was in this situation and that [the victim]
should take some blame (R. 239: 239; see also Addendum C).
11. Mr. KEITH had 1990 convictions of attempted theft by deception and theft by
deception, each a third degree felony. The State objected to defense counsel's attempt to
question the witness regarding his prior criminal convictions and the Court, after
reviewing Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 608 and 609, did not allow it. This was at least
in part because of defense counsel's failure to meet the notice requirement set out in Rule
609(b). A copy of this Rule is attached at Addendum A. The second day of trial, defense
counsel renewed the motion, stating that although discovery had been requested in
9

January of 2005, the defense did not receive from the State, Mr. KEITH'S prior criminal
history until the day before trial (R. 240: 257). Defense counsel asserted that he did not
have time to comply with the notice requirement of Rule 609(b). Id.
12. The Court attempted to clarify its ruling, finding defense counsel's discovery
request to be too broad and the prior convictions too old and remote, and the ruling stood
as originally ordered (R. 240: 259-265).
13. The officer who took Mr. KEITH'S statement then testified and the victim's
mother was recalled to testify about the victim's appearance which had changed from the
time of the incident until the trial. The State introduced a school photo of the victim and
counsel for defense made no objection (R. 240: 272-273).
14. Once the State rested, the Court, outside the presence of the jury, readdressed
the issue of its prior ruling, stating that it didn't believe that Rule 608(b) absolutely
prohibited conviction of a crime as a specific instance of conduct. It stated that its ruling
otherwise stood as rendered the previous day (R. 240: 274-275).
15. The defense made a motion regarding the charges, set out in the amended
information, arguing the Rule Against Multiplicity, which the Court took under
advisement, after allowing the parties time to provide authority. After which, the defense
rested without calling a single witness (R. 240: 285; see also Addendum C).
16. After readdressing its ruling in conjunction with the multiplicity claim made
by defense counsel, the Court stated that it was its perception that: " . . . It is not the same
act for a perpetrator to have a child suck on his penis than to suck on a child's penis.
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Those are separate acts. They may have occurred within the same brief time frame, but
they are separate acts. I'm not faced with the issue. I'm not ruling on whether or not a
succession of activity, then a resumption within the next five (5) minutes would
constitute a separate act. It is clear to this Court that what is alleged are separate — are
separate acts and, therefore, the motion to dismiss is denied" (R. 240: 289).
17. The jury returned its verdict of guilty on four (4) counts of forcible sodomy of
a child, each a first degree felony. After trial, Appellant obtained the services of another
attorney, JIM PARK, who reviewed the case for nearly two (2) months before
withdrawing in February, 2006. The Appellant was appointed counsel, TARA HAYNES,
who represented the Appellant at sentencing in March, 2006.
18. A presentence investigation (PSI) report was conducted recommending that
Appellant serve a term of imprisonment often (10) years to life for each first degree
felony offense, but did not specify as to whether the charges would run consecutive or
concurrent (R. 261). There was no request for a psychosexual evaluation.
19. At sentencing, the parties focused on aggravating and mitigating circumstances
in conjunction with the minimum mandatory sentence, but no reference was made or
consideration given to Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-406.5 (1953, as amended), (R.
302:3-17).
20. Appointed counsel was at some disadvantage having no transcript of the
proceedings and unaware of certain specific details critical to an assessment which could
have only come from knowing what happened at trial. The State of Utah and the trial
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court judge were in a position to know. Nevertheless, no mention is made of that
statutory provision or the possibility of probation. The record is silent. (R. 302: 3-17).
21. What is disclosed, however, is evidence that suggests that the Appellant would
have qualified. The specifics include the following:
(a) The Appellant did not use a weapon, force, violence, substantial duress or
menace, or threat of harm, either before or after committing the offense, in an attempt to
use fear in order to keep the child victim from reporting the offense;
(b) The Appellant did not cause bodily injury to the child victim, during or as a
result of the offense and did not cause the child victim severe psychological harm;
(c) The Appellant, prior to the offense, had not been convicted of any public
offense in Utah or elsewhere involving sexual misconduct in the commission of the
offense;
(d) The Appellant did not commit an offense described in this part four (4) sex
offenses, against more than one child victim or victims, at any time, or during the same
source of conduct, or previous to or subsequent to, the instant offense;
(e) The Appellant did not use, show, or display pornography or create sexually
base related photographs or tape recordings in the course of the offense;
(f) The Appellant did not act in concert with another offender during the offense or
knowingly commit the offense in the presence of a person other than the victim or with
lewd intention to reveal to another;

12

(g) The Appellant did not encourage, aid, allow or benefit from any act of
prostitution of sexual act by the child victim with any other person or sexual performance
by the child victim before any other person;
(h) The Appellant admits the offense of which he has been convicted but because
of no psychosexual assessment, it cannot be said that Appellant has been accepted for
mental health treatment in a residential sexual abuse treatment center that has been
approved by the Department of Corrections (DOC) under subsection (3) (defense counsel
representing Appellant at the time of sentencing would not have known to have such an
assessment done, but the same should have been requested and ordered at the time the
jury verdict was returned, as part of the request for a PSI report);
(i) Because of that oversight, rehabilitation of the Appellant through treatment is
unknown, based upon evidence provided by a treatment professional;
(j) Likewise, for reason of the same oversight, it is unknown whether it is the
professional's opinion that Appellant was not an exclusive pedophile and does not
present an immediate and present danger to community if released on probation and
placed in a residential sexual abuse treatment center;
(k) Because of the legally unrecognized relationship between the victimfs mother
and the Appellant's sister, the designations under subsection K would not apply, but the
additional conditions could have application and should have been considered by the trial
court judge. They were not.

13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This is a matter where the one issue preserved for review involves the trial court
judge erring in not allowing defense counsel to question the State's witness on prior
criminal convictions involving theft by deception. The Defense obviously had an interest
in the truthfulness of the State's witness where this witness was all that corroborated the
victim's allegation of unlawful sexual activity. Despite the great importance of the
veracity of the State's witness, the judge failed to consider the factors of Rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence, and simply ruled the defense could not question the State's witness
about his previous convictions on the basis of being too remote and old and because of
defense counsel's failure to provide the State with adequate written notice.
Also of concern is how the voir dire process was misused regarding the
questioning of potential jurors on the issue of homosexuality and advised each juror that
Appellant was a homosexual. This appears to have been a conscience attempt to avoid
prejudice but given the manner in which it was conducted and the general nature of
questioning, it was a poor trial strategy that constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel
and is more than plain error but manifest injustice on the part of all parties.
Defense counsel also failed to move for mistrial after evidence of other bad acts
came in as part of a fifth count that was dismissed before the jury started deliberating but
was of such a nature that, although not relevant to the remaining charges, was prejudicial.
Because of the way it was presented as part of another charge it took away from defense
counsel a chance to challenge through objection. Defense counsel was also ineffective in
not requesting a cautionary instruction and where it concerns such information that would
14

be considered reprehensible on its own account, failure to give such instruction
constituted manifest injustice.
At sentencing, it was error to not consider the Appellant for probation as an
alternative to the minimum mandatory sentence and although the record is silent in so
considering, it is sufficient to at least establish that Appellant qualified factually for
consideration, at least as far as necessary to demonstrate that a psychosexual assessment
should have been ordered with the ordering of the PSI report. Failure on the part of
defense counsel is evident, but the trial court and the State also have the duty to ensure
due process and fundamental fairness; the criminal justice system did not safeguard those
two principles when it failed to consider probation under Utah Code Annotated 76-5406.5 (1953, as amended) and, thus, a manifest injustice was committed against the
Defendant. The nature of the action is such that it should be reviewed not just from the
standpoint of defense counsel's ineffectiveness but from the standpoint that the entire
process failed due to the oversight and plain error of all parties.
ARGUMENTS
The proceedings involving the Appellant, COREY EVAN VONBERG, revolve
around a two day trial that started on the 22nd day of September, 2005, and sentencing
that occurred on the 14th day of March, 2006. There was a motion in limine that was
brought the day before the trial by the State which was denied by the Court in favor of
Appellant. The preliminary hearing was waived early in the proceedings, on or about the
3rd day of March, 2004. All other court appearances constitute reviews or status
conferences, where for one reason or another, the trial was continued or rescheduled.
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The Appellant was represented by retained counsel at trial, KEITH BARNES of BARNES &
ALLEN, L.L.C.. After trial, but before sentencing, JAMES PARK of THE PARK FIRM, entered
his appearance as successor retained counsel but withdrew on or about the 7th day of February
2006. The Appellant was appointed counsel, TARA HAYNES of the HAYNES LAW OFFICE,
for sentencing. New counsel was appointed for appeal, J. BRYAN JACKSON. Following this
Court's remand to the trial court, J. BRYAN JACKSON was removed as appellate
counsel because of a possible future conflict and JACK B. BURNS was appointed as
substitute counsel and filed a notice of appearance on August 30, 2007.
Only one issue appears to be preserved as required by the preservation doctrine for
appeal and it will be discussed first and foremost; however, also of great concern, at least
from this attorneys perspective, is the general and overall claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, both at trial and at sentencing and the plain error or manifest injustice that
occurred. Counsel for Appellant believes that defense attorneys were not the only parties
at fault under the circumstances. The trial court judge and State of Utah, through Iron
County, contributed by failing in their oversight responsibilities and, as a result, manifest
injustice and plain error occurred at both trial and sentencing.
A. Appellant did not receive effective assistance of counsel at trial.
To be successful on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Appellant
must demonstrate two things. First, he must show that counsel's performance was
deficient and second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense and the
outcome would probably be different. This is, of course, the Strickland standard,
established twenty (20) years ago in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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Although the trend in other areas seems to be heading in the direction of adopting
standards and guidelines put forth by the American Bar Association, the
Utah Court of Appeals has recently reaffirmed its commitment to following the
Strickland standard. In State v. King, 2006 UT App. 355, filed August 31, 2006, this
Court addressed the question of ineffective assistance of counsel in a similar case
involving a defendant's conviction of sexual abuse of a child after the Utah Supreme
Court, by grant of certiorari, determined that there was no error on the part of the trial
court and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the defendant's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Like in King, counsel for appeal here raises
ineffective assistance of counsel as a claim for the first time on appeal and believes that
the record is sufficient to review Appellant's claim to evaluate as a matter of law.
There is no question that the case of State v. King has and will have an impact
upon understanding the parlay between the plain error doctrine and ineffective assistance
of counsel and this case is perhaps the next extension. To briefly review, the Utah Court
of Appeals issued its first decision in State v. King, 2004 UT App. 210, in June 2004,
reversing King's conviction and remanding for new trial upon the fundamental premise of
right to an impartial jury, a part of the due process clause in Utah and United States
constitutions, and principles of fundamental fairness. Therein, this Court stated that the
voir dire examination served the dual purposes of enabling the trial court to select an
impartial jury and assisting counsel in exercising peremptory challenges, citing Mu'Min
v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (1991). This Court also cited its
own precedent of State v. Wooley, 810 P.2d, 444 (Utah App. 1991). That case cited to
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Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Dixon, for the proposition that it is the trial judge's
duty to see that the constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded.
Id. at 442. See also State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318, 319-20 (Utah 1977). Wooley pointed
out that the Supreme Court had reversed criminal convictions based solely on the
appearance that such right may have been jeopardized.
Thereafter, the State of Utah brought King before the Utah Supreme Court, by writ
of certiorari, which was granted, argued and a decision filed in January, 2006, reversing
the Court of Appeals' decision on the basis of the plain error doctrine. The plain error
doctrine in not new to the Utah Supreme Court, but has received more focus lately.
The Supreme Court made note of the fact that this Court refused to apply the plain
error review, stating that this Court's ruling was tantamount to a declaration that the jury
selection process is distinct from the general adversarial system injustice and is therefore
exempt from the procedures governing that system. See State v. King, 2006 UT 3, at 715.
While it is difficult for this attorney to locate just where in the Court of Appeals' decision
of 2004, the declaration tantamount to exemption to procedures is concluded, the
Supreme Court effectively shifted the fault for the compromised jury selection process in
King from the trial court to defense counsel by requiring that objections to the trial court's
conduct during voir dire be preserved. That is, objection must be made during those
proceedings or lost unless the claim could be found to exist under the plain error doctrine.
Under the plain error doctrine, the Appellant must first establish that an error did
in fact occur. Appellant asserts that an error did occur in this case by reason of inquiry
into Appellant's homosexuality. Second, the Appellant must establish that the error
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should have been obvious to the trial court. In understanding how obvious this particular
point was, the fact that the questions were asked is evidence enough. Clearly, all parties
took the wrong course on how to address the concern. It was obvious to them that action
needed to be taken. It was error on the part of all parties to allow it to be addressed in the
manner that it was. Third, the Appellant must establish that the error was harmful, i.e.,
that there is a "reasonable likelihood" that would have enjoyed a more favorable outcome
absent the error. Regarding this point, counsel for Appellant would be hard pressed to
think of a situation where the likelihood would be more likely. It is one thing to accuse a
person of criminal conduct, but it is quite another to declare to the potential jurors that the
person to whom they would be standing in judgment is homosexual to charges such as
forcible sodomy on a child.
In this regard, the present case is even more egregious than King, and therefore, in
Appellant's mind stands as an extension to the application of the doctrine whether the
same be upon principles of due process and fundamental fairness as viewed through the
eyes of the Court of Appeals or plain error as seen from the standpoint of the Utah
Supreme Court, it is clearly an error that requires reversal and remand.
Such action becomes all the more clear when considering this Court's ruling in
State v. King, 2006 UT App. 355, regarding deficient performance. Therein, this Court
states that the Appellant must overcome the presumption that under the circumstances,
the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. at ^f 6. There is no
question that what happened in this case was an attempt to try and avoid prejudice but
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was not well conceived or implemented. It is hard to consider this as being an oversight
as in King, but more along the lines of poor judgment and an unsound trial strategy.
B. The trial court erred in not allowing defense counsel to question the state's
witness, SHAWN ROBERT KEITH, about prior criminal convictions.
Midway through trial, toward the end of the first day, the State called SHAWN
ROBERT KEITH to testify. Mr. KEITH was in jail for a few days at the same time that
Appellant was incarcerated waiting for trial. Mr. KEITH testified that the Appellant
confided in him and disclosed how he had been involved with the victim in oral sex and
why Appellant thought the victim should take responsibility and part of the blame. (R.
239: 239; see also Addendum C). Mr. KEITH received the benefit of having the balance
of his jail sentence stayed and this was made known to the jury. The witness was asked if
he was always truthful and responded by saying that sometimes he was not. (R. 239: 242243; see Addendum C). The matter was addressed outside the presence of the jury to
consider whether defense counsel should be allowed to question Mr. KEITH on his past
criminal history, which involved fifteen (15) year old convictions of theft by deception
and attempted theft by deception. The interchange between the attorneys and the bench
revolved around a discussion of the application of Rule 609(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
From that discussion, the Court ruled to disallow such interrogation because counsel for
the defense had not given the State sufficient advance written notice of intent prior to
trial.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in assuming that Rule 609(b) applied. As
it states, Rule 609(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, applies to impeachment by evidence of
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conviction and requires advance written notice of intent to use such evidence. This was
not what defense counsel was attempting to do. Under the circumstances of this case, the
appropriate provision was Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence, which addresses specific
instances of conduct and makes reference to provision for the conviction of a crime, as
provided in Rule 609, stating that it may not be proved by physical evidence. Under
subsection (b), however, it goes on to read that the Court, in its discretion, may allow
such testimony if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and may be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness. In State v. Hobbs, 64 P.3d 1218, 2003 UT App 27, this
Court addressed the same issue in the context of lies and dishonesty stating, "[it] has long
been recognized that a cross examiner need to be given wide latitude in exposing a
witness potential bias." Id at 1224 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this
"wide latitude" in cross-examining is limited by Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403. Id.
This Rule of course addresses the classical balancing test of unfair prejudice versus
probative value and considers the issues out whether such testimony is misleading to the
jury or would cause undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of evidence.
These were not factors that the trial judge in this case was considering.
Mr. KEITH'S testimony was critical. He became the only corroborating witness
for the victim's assertion of inappropriate sexual activity. The State, notwithstanding the
fact that Mr. KEITH was incarcerated at the time, puts him forward as truthful and the
Court, by its ruling, limited the defense counsel in cross-examining the witness about
identified instances inconsistent to that assertion, particularly the fifteen (15) year old
past criminal convictions involving theft by deception. Appellant's counsel at trial should
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have been allowed full cross-examination and any limitation should have come from
considering the factors of Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence and the testimony not
disallowed for being too old and remote.
Appellant believes that the Court should have considered the advisory committee
notes, which indicate that the Rule be read in conjunction with Rule 404, Utah Rules of
Evidence, pertaining to prior crimes and bad acts. Under current Utah law, credibility can
be attacked regarding conviction of prior crimes and certain other incidences affecting
character for truthfulness in accord with Mickelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
See also State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah 1981).
That is to say, this Appellant asserts that while under Rule 609, there may have
been some restriction to introduce evidence in the form of some document showing
conviction, under Rule 608, defense counsel had the right to at least question Mr. KEITH
about having been convicted of theft by deception because it was a question going to the
witness1 possible untruthfulness. The trial court erred in not allowing that question to be
asked and its impact is evident from the fact that this witness provided the only testimony
or other evidence offered by the State corroborating the victim's assertion of
inappropriate sexual activity.
Under the circumstances of case at bar, the rationale offered by the Court for
ruling in favor of the State on the basis of defense counsel not providing the State with
sufficient written notice is unpersuasive and even illogical. From the record, it appears
that defense counsel was provided a copy of the witness1 past criminal history just the day
before trial (R. 240: 257; see also Addendum C). Counsel for defense had made a
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standard request for discovery and it is the practice, at least in Iron County, that
prosecutors proceed under an open file policy. However, past criminal history must come
through law enforcement who are not willing to release such information except through
the oversight of the prosecuting authority. For the trial court to assume that counsel had
some way of obtaining the witness' criminal history without the State's involvement is
fanciful. Defense counsel was relying upon the State to provide Mr. KEITH'S criminal
history, and the State was aware of such history before it provided the same. To now use
the notice requirement under 609(b) as a limitation to allow for cross-examination
tortures the intended meaning of the provision and imposes a restriction that the Rules
simply do not contemplate within the realm of cross-examination or discovery.
C. The trial court committed plain error when questioning jurors about
Appellant's homosexuality.
There were a number of problems that arose in the course of defending Appellant.
First, the Appellant is a self-proclaimed homosexual. Moreover, his sister is a lesbian,
living in a same sex relationship with the victim's mother. It is evident from the transcript
that all parties were concerned about the issue of homosexuality and how it would factor
in to Appellant's case. As counsel for Appellant on appeal, this attorney has the luxury of
viewing what transpired in hindsight and second guessing the judgment made by them.
Had the strategy been successful, it would still have failed scrutiny. Much of the
interrogation took place in camera. One has to wonder why the court would ask each
juror if they had any problem with knowing or working with homosexuals and in doing
so, declaring that the Appellant professed to be homosexual. Where counsel or the trial
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court intended to go with this sort of inquiry defies reason. There is no defense in being
homosexual and under the circumstances of this case no mitigation could be made
because the victim was under 14 years of age. It would have been inappropriate for the
judge to even suggest mitigation on the notion that Appellant was homosexual.
Therefore, what was to be gained? Such a declaration is per se prejudicial.
Because of the manner in which the questions were asked, the chance of receiving
an honest response through voir dire in camera was seriously compromised. That is to
say, the circumstances made it less likely that each juror would respond honestly and
openly. The questioning was in chambers with each potential juror individually. Those
present included the bailiff, the clerk, the county attorney, defense counsel and the
Appellant. In that setting, when the judge asked if he or she had predetermined views or
beliefs about homosexuality, homosexuals or homosexual practices, there was little
chance that the response would disclose actual bias or prejudice.
It is human nature for one to respond to socially sensitive issues that may cross an
individual's moral line of acceptability by stating that they have no problem with the
person or practice, whether in truth they hold predetermined, prejudicial beliefs. In that
setting, no answer about the subject can be taken as reliable.
When considering the line of questioning it is easy to see how inflammatory it was
to direct such inquiry to each prospective juror and declare that Appellant was
homosexual. The typical inquiry went as follows:
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THE COURT:

Thank you. In this case, it is alleged that Mr. - it may be
alleged that Mr. Vonberg is a homosexual. Will the fact
that he is an alleged homosexual have any impact in your
decision in this case.

MR. DALLEY:

No.

THE COURT:

Do you have any close friends or neighbors who are
homosexuals?

MR. DALLEY:

My niece that's lesbian.

THE COURT:

Okay. Based on your experience with your niece, have
you formed any opinions about homosexuals?

MR. DALLEY:

I think my opinions become more liberal. I was fairly close
to the subject 15, 10 years ago. Prior to that, I think I have
become more rounded -1 don't agree with it, but I'm more
tolerant.

THE COURT:

Thank you. Have you worked with homosexuals in your
employment?

MR. DALLEY:

Not that I know of.

THE COURT:

Have you ever been a victim of an action where the
perpetrator was a homosexual?

MR. DALLEY:

No.

(R. 239: 32; see also Addendum C).
This same line of questioning was asked of each juror (R. 239: 36-37, 45-46, 5354, 57-58, 62-63, 69, 73-74, 77-78, 83, 88-89, 95, 100, 103-104, 107, 119-120, 126, 132).
While the follow-up question from the Court was if there was any reason best known to
such individual potential juror, why he or she could not try the case fairly or impartially
upon the evidence, without any bias or prejudice, for or against either party, it is unlikely
that a person who did would volunteer to make it known.
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The damage is not necessarily done by asking relevant questions regarding the
subject but in declaring the Appellant homosexual. It changes everything. The responses
made now with Appellant in mind and in front of them are no longer reliable because the
setting is not conducive to openness and honesty.
In addition, the line of questioning avoided asking the real questions for their
concern. That is, the trial court (without reference to Appellant) should have asked each
juror if he or she believed that homosexuals were more prone to commit crimes such as
the one in question or if they believed homosexuals were less trustworthy or truthful. One
way of obtaining information that would have been more reliable in response under these
circumstances would have been by a written questionnaire. However, the manner in
which this interrogation was conducted was clearly ineffective, poorly conceived and
blatantly prejudicial against the Appellant.
D. Trial Counsel was also ineffective due to the non-presentation of a defense,
not moving for a mistrial and failing to request a cautionary instruction.
While one must acknowledge that defense counsel had a responsibility to object to
inappropriate information offered, he is not the only one with the responsibility for
insuring that the jury only consider reliable and credible evidence. The trial court and the
State also have a responsibility to see that justice is done and that injustice does not
manifest itself through the procedures involved in conducting a trial. What happened in
this case is as much manifest injustice as it is ineffective assistance.
The State initially filed five (5) charges against the Appellant, which gave rise to
the victim to testify of events that transpired on a hiking trip about the same time. That
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activity, which was criminal in nature, but not properly charged in the Information, was
disclosed to the jury. It consists of an inappropriate touching or other bad acts involving
the Appellant.
The State conceded to dismiss the fifth charge, Count III, before deliberation
began and there was at least an understanding that no additional new charges would be
filed, but defense counsel should have moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the jury
was then tainted by information that no longer was relevant to the charges for which the
Appellant was accused. Such a course of action becomes more apparent given the fact
that the Appellant did not testify and defense counsel did not present an affirmative
defense. Consequently, it is accurate to say that defense counsel was ineffective not just
for a flawed trial strategy, but also for his failure to force the issue of mistrial.
In the unlikely event that the trial court denied the motion, defense counsel should
have requested a cautionary instruction for the jury not to consider such evidence.
Defense counsel did not make such a motion.
This is, however, an area where this attorney believes that the responsibility also
falls to the prosecution, and perhaps even to the trial court, to whom it should have been
obvious that the consequence of what happened would be a basis for manifest injustice.
In a way it emphasizes what defense counsel was attempting to argue under the Rule
Against Multiplicity. Counsel for defense argued against the multiple counts being filed
in what he viewed to be a single criminal act and this circumstance presents itself as an
example of why such a rule should be more closely adhered to in multiple count cases to
avoid confounding the evidence or the trial rulings pertaining to credibility of evidence.
27

Defense counsel cited State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 1973, in support of this view but, in
fact, it does not really support his position. The trial court allowed the four counts to
stand as charged which is consistent with Morrison but gave no thought to the impact of
dismissing the fifth count after the jury had heard evidence now not relevant but highly
prejudicial. In doing so, the trial court made a finding that is material to another aspect of
error that came at the time of sentencing. What is suggested in the trial court's ruling is
that it might have been open to consider treating the separate acts as a single criminal
episode for disposition but made clear that such issue was not before it (R. 240: 289; see
also Addendum C). There is at least an impression left from this dialogue that the Court
would not have dismissed out of hand an alternative to sentencing the minimum
mandatory prison sentence (i.e., probation pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-5-406.5).
E. Defense counsel was ineffective at sentencing because of her failure to address
U.C.A. § 76-5-406.5.
From the record it is clear that no consideration was given to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 76-5-406.5 (1953, as amended), which in certain circumstances
allows for probation, involving offenses such as those to which Appellant was convicted;
namely, forcible sodomy of a child, Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-403.1 (1953, as
amended). For some unknown reason, Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-406.5 was
overlooked. However, it was clearly an oversight that should have been treated with
greater care. The record is sufficient to show that, at least from the factual findings,
Appellant would have been a candidate for consideration. That is to say, in the
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Appellants case there was no weapon, force, violence, substantial duress, menace or
threat of harm in committing the offense on either day.
There is some confusion regarding threat, because in this case, the victim had
written in his diary a fanciful event which was more forceful and not at all like what had
actually transpired involving Appellant. The victim acknowledged this as part of his
testimony. In fact, when asked specifically if there was a threat, the victim responded that
there was not. Appellant did not cause any bodily injury or severe psychological harm
that is evident from the record. The Appellant, prior to these offenses, had not been
convicted of any public offenses in Utah or elsewhere involving sexual misconduct.
Furthermore, the conduct in this case only involved one victim.
In addition, the activity did not involve the use or display of pornography,
photographs or tape recordings and third parties were not involved. There is no evidence
in the record suggesting that Appellant encouraged, allowed or benefited from any act of
prostitution or sexual act by the victim with any other person or involving any other
person.
In the instant case, the Appellant did not testify. However, there is evidence in the
record that the Appellant admitted to the offense, or at least to having contact, at the time
he was arrested and while he was in jail.
No testing was done on the Appellant involving psychosexual analysis because no
testing was required at the time the PSI report was ordered. Counsel should have
requested it, but the trial court should have ordered it notwithstanding. In addition, the
State should have seen to it that testing was provided and the office of Adult Probation
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and Parole (AP&P) performing the PSI report should have brought it to the State's
attention, if in fact, it was missed as an oversight.
Defense was going through some transition at this point. Mr. BARNES was first
replaced by Mr. PARK who then withdrew and Appellant was appointed counsel who
likely received a box of files just before sentencing. Nothing seems to have been done for
purposes of psychosexual assessment and so newly appointed defense counsel, not being
present at trial, likely assumed that the Appellant was not an appropriate candidate.
Moreover, there is no mention of this consideration given at the time of sentencing, but
all attention is focused toward argument on minimum mandatory sentencing involving
factors of aggravation or mitigation.
Without having ordered a psychosexual evaluation, the best that appointed counsel
could have accomplished at the time of sentencing would have been to request a
continuance to allow such an assessment to be done. Under the circumstances, given the
alternative of minimum mandatory sentencing, the short delay caused from having such
an assessment seems to have been a reasonable request. However, at the time of
sentencing, there is no mention made of possible probation or to the provisions found
within this statutory section. The record is silent both as to its consideration as well as to
any language that might be construed as disqualifying such consideration, except for that
which has been set forth heretofore, which involves the comment made by the trial judge
at the time of trial in considering defense counsel's argument for multiplicity which
implies that further consideration of alternatives at sentencing regarding the multiple
charges was not at that time before him but might be considered at the time of sentencing.
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As indicated, the discussion at sentencing did not include such consideration.
The negative impact of defense counsel's oversight of Utah Code Annotated,
Section 76-5-406.5 on Appellant cannot be overstated. Appellant now looks at what he is
ordered to serve, which amounts to twenty (20) years to life, and but for these oversights
he appears to be a viable candidate for consideration of probation with long-term
residential sexual abuse treatment. Given such circumstances, Appellant believes that the
matter should be remanded if for no other reason than for reconsideration of the sentence
in light of Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-406.5 (1953, as amended), directing that
the trial court consider whatever additional evidence necessary for purposes of assessing
whether or not Appellant would be a candidate under such circumstances for treatment.
There is no doubt that the Appellant would have the burden of proving all of the
conditions listed in Utah Code Annotated, section 76-5-406.5 in order to be eligible for
probation, however, the Defendant needs to be aware that he has a burden to meet before
he is able to attempt to persuade the presiding judge. There is nothing in the record, via
findings of fact or statements of any of the parties or the trial court that indicated the
Defendant was aware that he had a burden he could attempt to meet. Furthermore, the
court did not make a finding of fact that would preclude the Appellant from seeking
probation under the aforementioned section.
F. Manifest injustice, or plain error, was also committed by the trial court and
the State during both the trial and sentencing.
The basic right to an impartial jury is so fundamental to the concept of justice
instilled by both the statutory framework of judicial procedure as well as by its
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constitutional underpinnings that it is difficult to conceive of any judicial position that
would attempt to restrict it. Rather than rehash what has been addressed, it seems
appropriate to offer some parallel to what has been decided by this Court. In Salt Lake
Citv v. Struhs, 2004 UT App. 489, in conjunction with its consideration of Rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence, the court stated as follows: "Utah courts have long recognized the
prejudicial affect of prior conviction evidence.'We do not doubt1 evidence in prior
convictions and other bad acts have tremendous potential to sway the finder of fact
unfairly1 and increases the likelihood of conviction." See also State v. Florez, 111 P.2d
452, 459 (Utah 1989); State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583, 884 (Utah 1984). From that case it
was determined that where the trial court did not weigh the danger of unfair prejudice
with what it viewed as probative value of the prior conviction evidence, the trial court
abused its discretion when it allowed for such questioning of a defendant with prior
alcohol related convictions. The present case is one where the trial court considered
factors other than those found in Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, and erred in not
allowing defense counsel full cross-examination for factors beyond the contemplation of
the Rule.
The error in Struhs found to be made by the trial court in admitting the evidence of
prior convictions was determined to be not harmless error. Similarly, in this case, the trial
court's refusal to allow defense counsel to probe into the witness1 criminal history is
likewise not harmless error. Indeed, the error prevented defense counsel from
questioning the veracity of the only witness that could corroborate the victim; without
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that corroboration or appearance or credibility, the case at bar becomes a he-said-he-said
case in which the grounds for conviction are severely weakened.
Finally, it was plain error for the trial court to fail to fail to inquire as to whether
the Defendant intended on seeking probation as made possible through Utah Code
Annotated, Section 76-5-406.5 (1953, as amended). Although the Defendant does have
the burden of proving all of the required elements for probation under the aforementioned
statute, there is nothing in the record that would prevent him from meeting that burden.
Furthermore, there are no findings of fact made by the trial court during either the
sentencing or contained in the judgment which would preclude the Defendant from
seeking probation. The court did not order the evaluation required under the
aforementioned statute because the Defendant didn't qualify for probation on other
grounds; rather, it appears that all parties overlooked the applicability of section 76—
406.5.
The fact is the Appellant was denied due process, a statutory right manifest by the
existence of the provision itself and he should have been given consideration,
notwithstanding whose fault it may have been for such oversight. The Defendant
maintains that this oversight constitutes plain error in that the court erred in not
considering 76-5-406.5 in this case, that the trial court should have known of the error
and given that it appears by the record that the Defendant would qualify under the statute,
the error was harmful. In light of these factors and considering Appellant's claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel, Appellant believes that it would be a travesty of justice for
this Court to simply affirm the trial court's judgment and the jury's verdict.
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CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, the Appellant requests
judgment in his favor reversing or remanding as the Court deems appropriate together
with such and further relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper.
DATED this 9-1 day of November, 2007.
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Addendum A

Addendum A

78-2-2
Statutes and Session Law
Title 78 - Judicial Code
Chapter 02 - Supreme Court
78-2-2 Supreme Court jurisdiction.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a court
of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its
jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals,
over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court
of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or this
state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital

felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital
felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not
have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a
charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari for
the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Amended by Chapter 302, 2001 General Session
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76-5-406.5
Statutes and Session Law
Title 76 - Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 05 - Offenses Against the Person
76-5-406.5 Circumstances required for probation or suspension of sentence for certain sex offenses
against a child.

76-5-406.5. Circumstances required for probation or suspension of sentence for certain sex
offenses against a child.
(1) In a case involving a conviction for a violation of Section 76-5-402.1, rape of a child; Section 765-402.3, object rape of a child; Section 76-5-403.1, sodomy on a child; or any attempt to commit a
felony under those sections or a conviction for a violation of Subsections 76-5-404.1(4) and (5),
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, the court may suspend execution of sentence and consider probation
to a residential sexual abuse treatment center only if all of the following circumstances are found by the
court to be present and the court in its discretion, considering the circumstances of the offense, including
the nature, frequency, and duration of the conduct, and considering the best interests of the public and
the child victim, finds probation to a residential sexual abuse treatment center to be proper:
(a) the defendant did not use a weapon, force, violence, substantial duress or menace, or threat of
harm, in committing the offense or before or after committing the offense, in an attempt to frighten the
child victim or keep the child victim from reporting the offense;
(b) the defendant did not cause bodily injury to the child victim during or as a result of the offense
and did not cause the child victim severe psychological harm;
(c) the defendant, prior to the offense, had not been convicted of any public offense in Utah or
elsewhere involving sexual misconduct in the commission of the offense;
(d) the defendant did not commit an offense described in this Part 4, Sexual Offenses, against more
than one child victim or victim, at the same time, or during the same course of conduct, or previous to or
subsequent to the instant offense;
(e) the defendant did not use, show, or display pornography or create sexually-related photographs or
tape recordings in the course of the offense;
(f) the defendant did not act in concert with another offender during the offense or knowingly
commit the offense in the presence of a person other than the victim or with lewd intent to reveal the
offense to another;
(g) the defendant did not encourage, aid, allow, or benefit from any act of prostitution or sexual act
by the child victim with any other person or sexual performance by the child victim before any other
person;
(h) the defendant admits the offense of which he has been convicted and has been accepted for
mental health treatment in a residential sexual abuse treatment center that has been approved by the
Department of Corrections under Subsection (3);
(i) rehabilitation of the defendant through treatment is probable, based upon evidence provided by a
treatment professional who has been approved by the Department of Corrections under Subsection (3)

and who has accepted the defendant for treatment;
(j) prior to being sentenced, the defendant has undergone a complete psychological evaluation
conducted by a professional approved by the Department of Corrections and:
(i) the professional's opinion is that the defendant is not an exclusive pedophile and does not present
an immediate and present danger to the community if released on probation and placed in a residential
sexual abuse treatment center; and
(ii) the court accepts the opinion of the professional;
(k) if the offense is committed by a parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, or legal guardian of the child
victim, the defendant shall, in addition to establishing all other conditions of this section, establish it is
in the child victim's best interest that the defendant not be imprisoned, by presenting evidence provided
by a treatment professional who:
(i) is treating the child victim and understands he will be treating the family as a whole; or
(ii) has assessed the child victim for purposes of treatment as ordered by the court based on a
showing of good cause; and
(1) if probation is imposed, the defendant, as a condition of probation, may not reside in a home
where children younger than 18 years of age reside for at least one year beginning with the
commencement of treatment, and may not again take up residency in a home where children younger
than 18 years of age reside during the period of probation until allowed to do so by order of the court.
(2) A term of incarceration of at least 90 days is to be served prior to treatment and continue until the
time when bed space is available at a residential sexual abuse treatment center as provided under
Subsection (3) and probation is to be imposed for up to a maximum often years.
(3) (a) The Department of Corrections shall develop qualification criteria for the approval of the
sexual abuse treatment programs and professionals under this section. The criteria shall include the
screening criteria employed by the department for sexual offenders.
(b) The sexual abuse treatment program shall be at least one year in duration, shall be residential,
and shall specifically address the sexual conduct for which the defendant was convicted.
(4) Establishment by the defendant of all the criteria of this section does not mandate the granting
under this section of probation or modification of the sentence that would otherwise be imposed by
Section 76-3-406 regarding sexual offenses against children. The court has discretion to deny the request
based upon its consideration of the circumstances of the offense, including:
(a) the nature, frequency, and duration of the conduct;
(b) the effects of the conduct on any child victim involved;
(c) the best interest of the public and any child victim; and
(d) the characteristics of the defendant, including any risk the defendant presents to the public and
specifically to children.

(5) The defendant has the burden to establish by a preponderance of evidence eligibility under all of
the criteria of this section.
(6) If the court finds a defendant granted probation under this section fails to cooperate or succeed in
treatment or violates probation to any substantial degree, the sentence previously imposed for the
offense shall be immediately executed.
(7) The court shall enter written findings of fact regarding the conditions established by the
defendant that justify the granting of probation under this section.
(8) In cases involving conviction of any sexual offense against a child other than those offenses
provided in Subsection (1), the court shall consider the circumstances described in Subsection (1) as
advisory in determining whether or not execution of sentence should be suspended and probation
granted. The defendant is not required to satisfy all of those circumstances for eligibility pursuant to this
Subsection (8).
Amended by Chapter 213, 2004 General Session
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76-5-403.1
Statutes and Session Law
Title 76 - Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 05 - Offenses Against the Person
76-5-403.1 Sodomy on a child.

76-5-403.1. Sodomy on a child.
(1) A person commits sodomy upon a child if the actor engages in any sexual act upon or with a
child who is under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the actor or the child and the mouth or
anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either participant.
(2) Sodomy upon a child is a first degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), (2)(c), or (3), not less than 15 years and which may be
for life;
(b) except as provided in Subsection (2)(c) or (3), life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that
during the course of the commission of the sodomy upon a child the defendant caused serious bodily
injury to another; or
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the commission of the sodomy upon
a child, the defendant was previously convicted of a grievous sexual offense.
(3) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (2)(a) or (b), a court finds that a lesser term than
the term described in Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is in the interests of justice and states the reasons for this
finding on the record, the court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less than:
(a) for purposes of Subsection (2)(b), 15 years and which may be for life; or
(b) for purposes of Subsection (2)(a) or (b):
(i) ten years and which may be for life; or
(ii) six years and which may be for life.
(4) The provisions of Subsection (3) do not apply when a person is sentenced under Subsection (2)
(c).
(5) Imprisonment under this section is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406.
Amended by Chapter 339, 2007 General Session
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Rule 403
Utah Rules
RULES OF EVIDENCE
Article IV Relevancy And Its Limits
Rule 403 Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The
change in language is not one of substance, since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair
prejudice" as contained in Rule 403. See also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating
that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise." See
also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital
case ruled prejudicial and violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same effect.
Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).
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Rule 404
Utah Rules
RULES OF EVIDENCE
Article IV Relevancy And Its Limits
Rule 404 Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is
offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the
accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that
the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and
609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the
court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.
Advisory Committee Note B Rule 404 is now Federal Rule of Evidence 404 verbatim. The 2001
amendments add the notice provisions already in the federal rule, add the amendments made to the
federal rule effective December 1, 2000, and delete language added to the Utah Rule 404(b) in 1998.
However, the deletion of that language is not intended to reinstate the holding of State v. Doporto, 935
P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b) must also conform with Rules
402 and 403 to be admissible.
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Rule 608
Utah Rules
RULES OF EVIDENCE
Article VI Witnesses
Rule 608 Evidence of character and conduct of witness.

Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness.
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by
opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided
in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court,
if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1)
concerning the witness1 character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined
has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a
waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect
to matters that relate only to character for truthfulness.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the
witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced.
Advisory Committee Note: This amendment is in order to be consistent with changes made to the
Federal Rule.
© Lawriter Corporation. All rights reserved.
The Casemaker™ Online database is a compilation exclusively owned by Lawriter Corporation. The database
is provided for use under the terms, notices and conditions as expressly stated under the online end user license
agreement to which all users assent in order to access the database.

Rule 609
Utah Rules
RULES OF EVIDENCE
Article VI Witnesses
Rule 609 Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.

Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.
(a) General rule Tor the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403,
if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has b a n i onv n led ml ,i crime slmll be iidmitU'd ml if in\ ul\ enl iilisliniiesh, ut l.ilse
statement, regardless of the punishment,
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years ha> cu:^cu
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction
supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a
conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party
sufficient advance written notice ofintent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this
rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a
subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the
subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudication IN gcncialiv LK-I admissible under this rule. ; iu . w.-t
may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused it
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission
in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innrwvrw.(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does no; rendu evidence ol .. conviction i;;,idiiiKv»u)le.
Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible,
ADVISORY COMMIT 1 EENOl E
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and changes Utah law by granting the court discretion in convictions not
involving dishonesty or false statement to refuse to admit the evidence if it would be prejudicial to the defendant. Current
Utah law mandates the admission of such evidence. State v. Bennett, 30 Utah 2d 343, 517 P.2d 1029 (1973); State v. Van
Dam, 554 P 2d 1324 (I Jtah ](V76v Suiu \ McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (I Jtah 1980).,
There is presently no pro\ iv» -n «-

.:;. \.\\\ -m' ,n io 'v f bs, v 11 en id*

The pendency of an appeal oue> m i. - /
Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 206 P. 717 < 19?

•

••

.-.'

^

I his is in accord v • ith I Jtah case law. State v.

This rule is identical to Rule 609 oi the Federal Rules of Evidence. The 1990 amendments to the federal rule nkrchanges in the rule. The comment to the federal rule accurately reflects the Committee's view of the purpose of the
amendments.

•o
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Rule 19
Utah Rules
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Criminal Rules Updated through November 1, 2007
Rule 19 Instructions.

Rule 19. Instructions.
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court may instruct the jury concerning the
jurors' duties and conduct, the order of proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the alleged crime,
and the definition of terms. The court may instruct the jury concerning any matter stipulated to by the parties
and agreed to by the court and any matter the court in its discretion believes will assist the jurors in
comprehending the case. Preliminary instructions shall be in writing and a copy provided to each juror. At the
final pretrial conference or at such other time as the court directs, a part\ may file a v. ritten request that the
court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. The court shall inform the parties of its action
upon a requested instruction prior to instructing the jury, and it shall fun^sh the parties with a copy of its
proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jur>
n me instruction will assist the
jurors in comprehending the case. Prior to giving the written instruct,.
urt shall advise the parties of
its intent to do so and of the content of the instruction. A party may reqm M an interim written instruction.
(c) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the coui i nj<u>uiidbiy duccis, any party may file
written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of
such requests shall be furnished to the other parties. 1 IK- court sh.il! mlo o: counsel ' f i t s proposed action
upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive
this requirement. Final instructions shall be in writing and at least one copy provided to the jury. The court
shall provide a copy to any juror who requests one and may, in its discretion, provide a copy to all jurors.
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court shall endorse its u a :
shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the
endorsement what part of the charge was given and what part was refused
(e) Objections to written instructions Mian ui- nutuu bcioic lit*, institutions are given to the jury.
Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to
consider its verdict. The court shall provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the jury.
Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be
assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In stating the objection the party shall identify the
matter to which the objection is made and the ground of the objection.
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and ti ii.^ com, .. i. ^
it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all que^tion^ of fa< »
(g) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has given the jury its final
instructions. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon time for argument shall be within the
discretion of the court.
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Addendum B
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TROY A. L i l i U i - USB #9061
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
82 North 100 East, Suite #201
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 865-5310
Telecopier: (435) 865-5329
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, and
TOMMITMENT

amtill,

vs.

COREY EVA
12/02/1965
518-66-4216
Defendant.

Judge G. Michael Westfall

The Defendant >•'•'•

' \N VONB ERG, having been found guilty by a jury of four

(4) counts of Forcible Sodomy on a Child, each a First-Degree Felony, on September 23, 2005,

having been called on for sentencing on March 14, 2006, in Cedar City, Utah, and the above-

together with his attorney of record, Tara A. Haynes, and the State of Utah having appeared by

andthrough

:.

;

Deputy Iron ('ounly AHumcy liny A J illlr, anil I lie < 'mill having irvii'wrd

the sentencing recommendation and having further reviewed thf : >!<- in detail and thereafter
1

,

•

•'

having heard statements; from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Deputy Iron County Attorney,
and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Judgment,
Sentence, and Commitment, to wit:

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
COREY EVAN VONBERG has been convicted by a jury of 4 counts of Forcible Sodomy on a
Child, each a First-Degree Felony, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had
anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to
the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as
charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, COREY EVAN VONBERG, and
pursuant to his conviction of Count 1: Forcible Sodomy on a Child, each a First-Degree Felony,
is hereby sentenced to a term of 10 years to life.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, COREY EVAN VONBERG, pay a fine
in the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), including an 85% surcharge for his
conviction of the offense.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, COREY EVAN VONBERG, pay a
twenty-five dollars ($25) Court Security Fee for his conviction of the offense.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, COREY EVAN VONBERG, and
pursuant to his conviction of Count 2: Forcible Sodomy on a Child, each a First-Degree Felony,
is hereby sentenced to a term of 10 years to life.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, COREY EVAN VONBERG, pay a fine
in the, amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), including an 85% surcharge for his
conviction of the offense.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, COREY EVAN VONBERG, pay a

twenty-five doll nrs ($2r)| Com I Security P<v lot his c in i/icliioii ol line offeiisi;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above sentences for Counts 1 and 2 shall run
I (Hiii iiiiiii ill! i i1 ilh urn iiiinfhni
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, COREY EVAN VONBERG, and
pursuant! In IIM I IUVKIIUII I "i "utiiit 'I. I1 ...;ML .\u-:a\ ui:,.

.,

. ,.ot-DegreeFelony,

is hereby sentenced to a teur «•» 10 yeur* t^ li tV
l'j'| iS FURTHER ORDF-KhD thai ^

^ iciidanM'Okk = I \ K *

sb; i<^, pay a fine

in the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), iiicluding an 85% surcharge for his
conviction of the offense.
ITISFI JRTHER ORDERED that tlr 1 Vloiuhnit, rORFA FVAN VONBER
twenty-five dollars ($25) Coin I Security Fee for his convicuon ^ ihe ol )er\^e
"'

HEREBY O R D F P M
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^NBERG,and

pursuant to his conviction ol < Y>unt 5: Forcible Sodom) on a < tn\! ; each a First-Degree Felony,
;• tu\

. >- i.-. ". <.-.

/eai s to life •

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, CORF^i H V A N VONBERG, pay a fine
in the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), ii icluding an 85% surcharge for his
conviction of the offense.
ITIS FURTHER ORDERED

^^

the Defendant^

COREY

EVAN VONBERG, pay a

twenty-five dollars ($25) Court Security Fee for his conviction of the offense.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above sentences for Counts 4 and 5 shall run

with the sentences for Cipunts 4 and 5
1

'

*

i

• •• •

ueuuaiH

. have no COT,.... i

a

or the victims family.
FURTHER, that the Defendant shall pay extradition costs of five hundred and fifty-eight
dollars and eighty cents ($558.80) to the Iron County Sheriffs Office.
FURTHER, that the Defendant shall pay extradition costs of one hundred and thirty-one
dollars and sixty-four cents ($131.64) to the Utah State Commission on Criminal and Juvenile
Justice (C.C.J.J.).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall pay restitution and that restitution
shall remain open.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, COREY EVAN
VONBERG, and deliver him/her to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and
confined in accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.
DATED this

day of March, 2006.
BY THE

rf'i%%

CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the

original Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. COREY
EVAN VONBERG, Criminal No. 061501000 now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS ni\ li mil ,unl Ihi > r,il nl , ml iilln i in (Vil.u <'11', I uiinh, nl In in, Slnlc nf
Utah, this ^7?

day of March, 2006.

„„„>,.
/'V;)B>A-.

\?>- '•*&&" v f
*£&"%*# V

CAROLYN BULLOCH
District Court Clerk

By:
—/I CceJtcsf
/\/s^—?s
Deputy District CodrT Clerk X

~--^,w"'

^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify th#t on t h e j ^ d a y of March, 2006,1 mailed/hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid to the following address:
Tara A. Haynes
Attorney for Defendant
320 West 200 South, Suite 270B
Salt Lake City. UT 84101-3778
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Addendum (!

nature of these allegations?
MR. l)ATJJ',,i:
THE COURT:
.nciL Mistei -homosexual.
iXave

"1-

" i

Thank you.

ii "M' >"

WijJ

an upsetting topic, but, no.
In this «„ase it is alleged

MMpj'M

LiiiC ill . Vonberg is a

the fact that he is an alleged homosexi lal

any impact in y • > i d* >< ' i " i MR. DALLEY:
THE COURT:

his case?

No.
b

i

TT

'

mends

111

or

neighbors who are homosexuals?
;

MR. DALLEY:
THE COURT:

A ni-<:.' Mini ';: Lesbian.
Okay.

Rased on your experience with your

niece, have you formed any op in' M V
up . b A L L E Y ;
liberal,
i.

T think

I was fairly

hornosexuals.;

my opinion1 s become

closed

1-' i J o L to that , T t h i n k

ii

more

*., M i " nub"i>r.-t; 1 5 , t e n y e a r s
I have become

more

rounded

-

I

c n't agree with it, but 1"m more t o ] e r a i I t .
1

iHE O.MMJ

Thank you.

Have you worked, with

homosexuals i n yc in emp1oyment ?
hS

i.i]

UALLE

THE COURT:

ihj't; that I know of.

THK cnnpT:

No.
IMw, is tl lere any reason best known to

yourself wh y you cou1d not try this case taii 1v jid
*" p ( i rt. i a L 1 ynp'-n 1 he evidence without any bias or prejudice

L__J

I
1

And have you ever bee n t he v ic t i m o f a i i y

action v; h ^ i'(•i M> perpetrator was a homosexual?
MR. DALLEY:

I

1

Um-hmm.
Why did you come back to Iron County9
Urn, because school was starting soon.

And I had to

ady for school.
During that time, who was living with you9
Urn, my mom, my two older sisters and Valerie Vonberg.
And Valerie Vonberg.

And she1 who?

She is Corey's brother.
Brother9
I mean sister.
Okay.

So, when you went back home, was Corey there9

He was.
Okay.

What was his purpose of being at your house9

Repairs at our house.
What type of repairs were you guys doing9
Painting.

Putting shelves up.

General household

s, I guess.
Okay.

How long did Corey stay at your house9

Urn, a month probably, I think.
Were you there the whole time he was there9
I was not.
About how long were you present when he was in the

Urn, three weeks.
You were there for about three weeks 9

%

Q

Then what happened?

A

Urn, and then we engaged in some inappropriate

matters.
^

Q

Can you describe to the jury what those were.

<

A

Urn, they were -- they were about -- it was about --

| can you repeat the question?
Q

Yes.

A

We undressed and had sexual content.

Q

Like what?

explain.

What happened?

How did you get undressed?

Go ahead and

Describe how you were undressed.

A

By myself.

Just --

Q

And did he undress himself?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Then, urn, there was some oral sex.

Q

So, describe what happened.

Then what happened?

Did he perform oral sex

on you?
A

Yes.

Q

Did he do that first or did you give him oral sex?

A

He did it to me first.

Q

So, when you mean oral sex, he sucked on your penis

with his mouth?
A

Yes.

Q

And for how long did he do that?

A

Urn, 30 seconds.
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A

Urn, it was up in some kind of, up in a canyon.

Q

Okay.

Describe -- why would you go up to the canyon

,with Corey?
A

Because we had planned it previous to all this

-behavior, to go hiking.

/-

t

Q

So, you and he planned to go on a hiking trip?

A

Um-hmm.

Q

Explain to the jury.

Where were you guys going and

what were you planning on doing?
A

It's close to our house.

It's, we just -- we were

going to go up there to hike with -- I have a dog, just a
road or just to hike around and stuff.
Q

So, did your mom know that you were going hiking with

Corey?
A

Yes.

Q

And so, you and Corey went up with a dog?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Urn --

Q

Where did you go hiking9

A

There's a road that leads up to one of the city's

water tanks.

And where did you go?

And just beyond that we parked a truck as we

drove to that spot, then we hiked up the mountains.
Q

How many days after you slept in the tent?

How many

days after did this occur9
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A

Two.

Q

Two days?

A

Um-hmm.

Q

So, what did you do while you were up hiking?

A

Urn, I read some -- I read one of my books for school

project, I think.
Q

Do you recall the book you read?

A

I think it was one of Lemony Snickets' books.

Q

And did anything happen between you and Corey up

there?
A

Yes.

Q

What happened?

A

Urn, the same thing that happened in the tent except

on a blanket.
Q

Describe in detail to the jury exactly what happened.

Was there anything said between you and Corey?
A

Yes.

He -- no.

Wait, there wasn't.

to pull on my penis.
Q

He started to pull on your penis?

A

Yes .

Q

What do you mean by pull 9

A

Masturbate.

Q

So, he was masturbating you?

A

Um-hmm.

Q

And did anything else happen 9

1

He just started

remember?
A

November 4th, 2003.

Q

Do you write in your journal very often?

A

Yeah.

Q

Why did you take so long to write in your journal?

If this happened in August, why didn't you write it in your
journal?
A

Because there was lots of family reunions and outings

and stuff, and I didn't want anybody to read it or anything.
Q

Do you recall what you wrote in your journal?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Urn, yeah.

Q

You wrote that you were sexually abused?

else?

What did you write?

Do you remember?

I wrote that I was sexually abused.
Anything

Any other details?

A

Yes.

I told, I wrote that it happened in a bedroom.

Q

You said in the journal that what happened in the

bedroom?
A

That the sexual abuse happened in the bedroom.

Q

Did this happen in the bedroom?

A

No.

Q

Why would you write that it happened in the bedroom

then?
\

A

Urn, I think I was just frustrated, and I wanted to

make it sound worse than it really did.

MR. BARNES:

Your Honor, leading the witness.

I

I recognize, Your Honor, that there is going to be a lot of
I leading.

However, I think he would be able to read his

I" writing probably better than counsel.
V-

|

THE COURT:

Mr. Little, let's see -- let's first see

>~

| if the witness can read his own handwriting before we try to
refresh his memory.
BY MR. LITTLE: .
Q

That's fine.

' sentence over again.

Could you try to start that last
I think you just skipped a few words.

I apologize.
A

"Because I bet you are way cool, because if you are a

girl, or you are a boy.

I'll write some other time."

Then I

signed my name at the bottom.
Q

Now, when you are writing a journal, who are you

writing to?
A

Somebody in the future.

Q

Now, in that, you mentioned that it happened in a

room.

And we discussed about this.

And you mentioned

that -- but did it happen in a room?
A

No.

Q

And, also, you kind of mention about the bruises.

Something about he threw you down and there were bruises.

I
Did you get any bruises?
A

No.
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Q

And, also, you said something about that he would

hurt your family.

Did he ever tell you that he would hurt

your family?
A

Um, not that I can remember.

Q

So, why would you write that?

A

Um, I donft know.

I think I was just frustrated and

wanted the attention, I guess.
Q

So, that!s a little different than what your

testimony was when you talked with law enforcement though,
right?
A

Um-hmm.

Q

So, today, are you telling the truth?

A

Yes.

Q

Now, let!s go forward and talk about when you

actually first disclosed this.

Who did you disclose it to?

A

My dad.

Q

Do you remember what time that was?

A

Right after Thanksgiving of 2003.

Q

Okay.

A

Um --

Q

How did that come to pass 9

A

My dad wanted to talk to me one night after my cousin

And describe what happened with that.

had just left to go back to Salt Lake.

1
Q

Okay.

And what was the nature of that conversation?

A

Um, dad thought I was searching some things on the
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I have two smaller children with my current wife.
would have been living with us at that time.
my current wife has a son that I adopted.

Natalie

And I have --

And he was also

living with us.
Q

Okay.

Now, let's talk about it in November of 2003.

Now, your son approached you about, well, actually you
approached your son about some concerns you had about some
internet usage; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

How did that come about?

A

It came about that my wife and I decided, you know,

kids aren't perfect.

Let's, we ought to just check the

history on the computer and what had been done on the
computer.

So, at that time, we found that some pornographic

sites had been accessed on the computer.
thought it was my 18 year-old son.

So, at the first I

So, I first approached

him and said, have you accessed any of those sites?
no, he hadn't.

So, this was Thanksgiving weekend.

Saturday evening I took John into his room.

He said,
So, that

And I said,

John, I found some things on the internet that were quite
disturbing to me.

So, have you accessed any of those sites 9

And, at that time, he didn't say anything and just totally
broke down in tears and indicated that he had been abused by
\
Mr. Vonberg.

And, at that time -- at that time, then that

was late Saturday night.

Sunday morning we contacted the

1 QO

Q
house?

A

What was the living arrangements when he was at your

1

Where did he stay?

J

He chose to stay in the tent outdoors.

brought his dog with him.
be in the house.
Q

He had

1

And I had asked that the dog not

1

Our dogs are not in the house.

1

And when did John come back from his dad's house to

1

stay wi th you?
A

Urn, I don't remember the exact date.

least a week before his birthday.

He came at

1

Because he spent time

1

helping Corey with some of the painting and fixing.

J

Q

And when is his date of birth again?

J

A

August 18th.

I

Q

What year?

J

A

'90.

Q

Okay.

Now, Mister -- did John sleep out with Mr.

1

Vonberg ?

1

A

Yes.

Q

And you are aware of that?

A

Yes .

Q

And were you okay with that?

A

I felt a little bit uncomfortable, but I didn't have

There was a night when he was invited to sleep.

I

1

reason to suspect anything.
Q

Did you voice this concern to anybody?

A

I asked Val.

concerned 9

I said, Do I have any reason to be

And she gave me none.

J

So, I said okay.

Then,

9HQ

okay.
Q

If John chooses to do this, then, thatfs fine.
Did you or Val ever go and check on them while they

were sleeping in the tent?
A

No.

I did not.

There was some, a conversation when

we were, if I recall, discussing some of the remodeling
concerns.

And Val said, I'll go and talk to Corey.

But I

never went to the tent except in the daytime.
Q

This is when they were in the tent, she went out and

talked with them?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, when did you learn of the abuse?

A

It was a Thanksgiving weekend.

for that holiday.
Sunday.

That was his holiday.

Paul had the children
And he called me on

Told me he needed to speak to me about something

that John had told him.

And so, I got the news over the

phone that John had disclosed to his dad that Corey had
sexually abused him.
Q

And how did you respond to that or react?

A

I fell apart.

Q

Did you ever discuss anything with Val or with Corey

about that9
A

Valerie and I spoke about it at length, of course.

I

never spoke to Corey.

I
Q

Ever talk to John about it?

A

Yes.

John and I have discussed it.

Not in detail.
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A

6073 North 2300 West, here in Cedar.

Q

And what do you do for a living9

A

I am a Utah state licensed investigator.

I do

computer forensics.
Q

Okay.

Tell us how you came about to get on this

case.
A

I was called by the prosecuting attorney's office.

They requested that I take a look at a computer that they
seized or taken for evidence in this case.
Q

Okay.

And what computer did you examine9

Do you

recall9
A

Initially, it was a Dell desktop computer.

the first computer.
Q

It was

I received it on the 23rd of May 2005.

And what was the parameters in what you were supposed

to look at 9
A

Urn, I was instructed to look for images of a

pornographic nature and websites visits of the same nature
between the dates of August 1st, 2003 and November 30th,
2003.
Q

Okay.

And did you find anything on that

A

On that computer, I did not.

computer9

The only thing that I

found on that computer, there was internet base during that
time period.

There were six emails that were sent and

\
\

received, none of which had the content that I was instructed
to look for.

Q

So, the computer was hooked up then?

A

It had the capability to be hooked up.

There were

emails that were the set-up for emails for Microsoft when you
actually install the operating system.

And there were two,

three -- let's see, two emails that were personal that were
sent during that time period.

Other than that, there was no

internet usage at all.
Q

Then you examined the second computer?

A

I did.

I was asked again by the prosecuting office

to look at a second computer, which was a generic desktop PC,
which I received and analyzed June 15th of 2005.
Q

Okay.

And what was your findings in that, in looking

at that computer?
A

Using some case software which I use, took a look at

the hard drive.

And between, again the same time period,

August 1st, 2003 through November 30th, 2003, I found that
there were 1,563 websites that had been visited during that
time period and 190 emails that had been sent or received
during that time period, some of which had been deleted,
which I recovered.

I recovered 2,916 deleted graphic files.

And two were deleted directories on the computer.
Q

And so when you say deleted, how are files deleted9

A

Normally, the course of computer operations, after

I
you are finished looking at a website, it will be recorded in
a web cache on the computer

And, as time goes by, it
?i 7

A

That's correct,

2I

Q

Would that be an accurate depiction?

3

A

Yes,
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Q

Let's talk a little bit about the deleting.

Those

5 1 that use computers, which most people do, are familiar with
6I

taking a file, and on the front, or the front screen, the

7 1 computer screen's main screen, you see a little garbage can.
8 J And you pull the file over and you delete it.

Right?

A

Yes.

10I

Q

And that can be -- that can be recovered?

11

A

Yes.

12I

Q

In fact, that would have been recovered in your first

13 1 analysis, correct?
14

A

Very probable, yes.

In fact, the things that I did

15 1 recover, a lot of it came from that recycle bin.
16 1

Q

But someone went at least a step further to try to

17I

permanently delete what was pulled up in November of 2003,

18I

correct?

19

A

Yes.

20 1

Q

And you stated on direct examination to Mr. Little

211

that you were able to retract some of that information.

22I

However, there is information that you were unable and, quite

23 1

frankly, you would not be able to.

Would that be a fair

24

A

That's correct.

25I

Q

And is it not true that as much as 30 percent of

—

Vonberg on that information9
A

Yes, I did.

Q

Okay.

A

Well, he said that during the summer of 2003 he

What did he tell you?

Do you recall9

stayed with his sister for about a month out east of Cedar
City here.

And that while he was here, his sister and her

roommate didn't like to have dogs in the house, so he stayed
m , out in the pasture with the horses, had a tent and a
sleeping bag that he used there.

And he told me that on one

night while he was there that John stayed out there in the
tent with him.

And he told me that while they were out there

they talked about various things, and that he showed him some
Native American bead work that he had.

He said that they

talked about his homosexual lifestyle.

And he explained to

me that it was common knowledge that he was gay and that,
apparently, John asked him about that, why he was gay.

And

he explained to John that he was raised with bisexual women
and that he wasn't interested in doing it with women.

And he

said that while they were sleeping out there that he shared
part of his sleeping bag with John
He denied that there was any contact with John other
than eyes, he said.

But he said it wasn't like he was

running around naked or anything.

That's all I recall.

I

I
can -- is there anything -Q

That's fine.
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recall?
A

There was oral sex.

He was giving him oral sex.

Q

John was or?

A

Corey was giving John.

Q

Oral sex?

A

Correct.

Q

And he said that the kid needed to take

responsibility?
A

Right.

He said it was partly his responsibility that

he was in this situation.

And that he should take the blame,

that it wasn't all his fault.
Q

Did he tell you about any other incidences?

A

He told me about one other incident up on Harmony

Mountain.

I don't know too much about that.

I just knew it

happened again up on the mountain.
Q

Okay.

Did he explain to you anything, any details of

what happened in the mountain -- on the mountain?
A

No, he didn't.

Q

Okay.

Did he elaborate in terms of what type of

contact what happened in the mountain9
A

Not in the mountain.

Q

Okay.

A

The only other thing I could recall is when they were

Did he tell you anything else?

\

out in the tent, that his sister went out there, the
flashlight, was checking on him.

And the next day morning
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Q

Well, apparently, you did, right?

A

No,

Q

It's not the case?

That's not the

case.
It's not the case you didn't

discuss it with my client?
A

He talked about it.

I didn't discuss it with him.

Q

You were sentenced to serve ten days incarceration;

is that correct?
A

Correct.

Q

And you met with, apparently, county attorney Scott

Garrett who also was a religious leader of yours after you
had served eight days; is that correct?
A

I believe I met with him after I served the first

three days, I believe.

Maybe it was the second three days

after I served, I spoke with him.
Q

You never served the full ten days though?

A

No, sir.
THE COURT:

Mr. Barnes, I hate to interrupt you, but

I've got a tape problem.

Can we just take a brief -- briefly

interrupt you, then we'll fix the tape issue.
to step down.

We'll

just

replace

the

tape

You don't need

right

now.

Court's in recess for just a minute.
All right.

We are recording again.

It's 4:50.

Mr.

Barnes, you may proceed.

i
BY MR. BARNES^:
Q

Thank you, Your Honor.

Mr, Keith, do you always tell
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the truth?
A

There's been times that I haven't told the truth.

Q

So, sometimes you tell the truth and sometimes you

don't tell the truth?
A

Under oath I am telling the truth.

Q

So, if you are not under oath, you don't tell the

truth to the people on the outside?
A

That's not necessarily the case.

I know in the past

I have not always been honest, but -MR. BARNES:
THE COURT:

Your Honor, may counsel and I approach?
Okay.

Do you want this on or off the

record?
MR. BARNES:
THE COURT:

On the record.
On the record.

All right.

(Whereupon a brief side bar was conducted off the
record.)
THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there

is an issue that I need to discuss with the attorneys outside
of your presence.
the jury room.
quickly.

So, the bailiff is going to take you into

We'll hopefully get this resolved fairly

And then as soon as we have resolved this issue,

we'll have you come back again.
Same admonition as before.
with anyone or among yourselves.
discuss the case in your presence.

Do not discuss this case
Do not allow anyone to
And do not talk to or

rcipliance with 609.

First ruling was that defense, because

ft?*
:ense did not give notice pursuant to Rule 609(b), Your
ffior was not going to allow defense counsel to question the
ftness relating to this past conviction.

Your Honor, as to

rftat, I would like to give some further argument.
Your Honor, on January 31st, 2005, defense propounded
iiscovery upon the state of Utah.

In discovery, it was

Requested that the state would produce any and all relevant
hritten or recorded statements of the defendant, any
jfcodefendant or any witnesses to the facts allegedly
Supporting the charge contained in the information.

As the

It
Fcourt is aware, the state of Utah has the burden to proof
ytheir case beyond a reasonable doubt.

In this case, the

;state of Utah, they were aware of Shawn Keithfs prior
|criminal history, stated yesterday in court.

The state of

!§
IfUtah never provided a criminal history or that information to
!f the defense.

Defense gathered that information the day

%

i\ before trial.

And that's when the defense had, yes, defense,

certainly, in preparing in that one could state that, well,
it could have been done before.

But, again, itfs not the

defensefs burden to be able to come up with any and all of

|2

f3

the information.

So, through discovery, Your Honor, I would

suggest to i^his court that the state of Utah should have
provided that information and, therefore, the defense could

25
have had time that we could have complied with Rule~609(b).

walls in the jail on its face, on its face, there is, there
Vcould

be

credibility issues there.

Too, compound that with

the fact that this inmate in this case, Shawn Keith, has a
prior conviction, theft by deception, regardless of the fact
that that's more than ten years old.

As the court is aware,

itfs the court's discretion to allow testimony come in
regardless of how old it is.
THE COURT:

To clarify my ruling, before we go on,

initially my ruling —

well, as I look at Rule 608 and 609,

there are two rules that have to be addressed.
whether extrinsic evidence can be admitted.

One is

And the other is

whether under Rule 608, specific instances of conduct for
attacking a

witness1 character for truthfulness, other than

a conviction of a crime, may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence, but they may in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness in
cross-examination.

Initially, since no notice was provided

with intent to use the prior conviction, that the extrinsic
evidence was not admissible under Rule 609.

609 indicates

that evidence of a conviction more than ten years old is not
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party
sufficient notice of intent to use the evidence to provide
the adverse party an opportunity to contest the use of it.
That's a notice issue.

And you are telling me that you think

that your discovery requests were broad enough if the state

had that information they should have provided it to you, and
if you -- if you had been provided that information earlier
you could have notified them.

But since you weren't provided

that information and only found out a day before you couldn't
provide them the information in advance or in advance of the
hearing other than just to present it at the time that Mr.
Keith was on the stand; is that correct?
MR. BARNES:

That is correct.

I'll further state

that in paragraph four of said discovery that was propounded
to the state, and I read, "Please produce any and all —

any

and all evidence known to the prosecutor tending to negate
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the defense for reduced
punishment."
It's very general and broad but, nevertheless, Your
Honor, this certainly would go towards mitigating the guilt
as a witness for the state of Utah.

Credibility is being put

in question.
THE COURT:

Do you have any case law to suggest that

a prosecutor has an obligation to disclose that kind of
information?
MR. BARNES:

I don't have any specifically on that.

But, as the court is aware, the state's burden is great when
it comes to -THE COURT:

Oh, I agree it is great.

I was just

r
If there is any appellate court decisions that
ithe state has to anticipate defenses, then present any
ESehce that they might think or guess that you might use at
irial.
MR. BARNES:
THE COURT:
MR. BARNES:

I do not.
Okay.
If I can go to the next, to the latter

part of my argument, Your Honor.
evidence.

And it addresses extrinsic

If I correctly heard Your HonorTs ruling

yesterday, Your Honor first addressed the 609(b), which Your
Honor has restated.

Then Your Honor went to Rule 608.

And

Your Honor then stated that recognizing that the court has a
discretion to allow this.

But the court stated Ifm not going

to simply allow that to come in as a document showing
conviction.

But question to the witness as it relates to

whether or not you have a conviction seems like Your Honor
felt that's something the court could do.

However, then it

came back to the ultimate ruling on 608 that Your Honor felt
because of the time, extended time since the conviction,
being 15 years, that Your Honor then felt that maybe would
not be relevant or the probative value might be greater.
I'm renewing -- I'm renewing this issue with the court.

So,
And

I am asking the court to allow either, (a), Mr. Keith to come
back and a question can be posed, Do you have a conviction of
theft by deception, a third degree felony from 1990, which if
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he answered yes, end that.

Or if it!s something that Your

Honor rules in five and Mr. Keith came back, defense would
accept an offer that he has that record.
THE COURT:

As I read 608(b), and this is a sad state

of affairs, and I suppose why attorneys are necessary,
because 608(b) could be interpreted in two ways.

One reading

of 608(b) would indicate that anything can be inquired into
if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness regardless of
Rule 609.

In other words, I could just ignore Rule 609, and

as long as no extrinsic evidence is admitted, I can allow it
to be inquired into on cross-examination.

However, another

reading of 608(b) is that a conviction of a crime as a
specific instant of conduct cannot be proven by extrinsic
evidence.

And it could go so far as to say that convictions

of crime are not considered to be specific instances of
conduct.

So, the 608 doesn't even apply to specific

instances of conduct.

In other words, the other than

conviction of a crime, as provided in Rule 609, is a limiting
factor or limiting language that applies to specific
instances of conduct.

And it doesn't broaden 608 but,

instead, it limits 508.

So, there are two interpretations.

Is there any law of which you are aware that suggests I
should adopt either inte rpretation of Rule 608?
i

1

MR. BARNES:

THE COURT:

No, Your Honoic.
All right .

Mr . Little?

?fi?

1

MR. LITTLE:

Your Honor, there's been four attorneys

2

on this case:

Mr. Little, Mr. Leigh, Mr. Allen and now Mr.

3

Barnes.

4

first three, all of it.

5

criminal history.

6

answered some specific items that I believe he did not

7

possibly have other than the stuff that I already provided to

8

his partner, Mr. Allen.

9

case and you get the file, that you have all that

In my record, I have sent my discovery to at least
In that file was Shawn Keith's

Now, when Mr. Barnes got on board, I

I believe that when you get on a

10

information.

11

Honor, I still don't think that -- I think it's too remote.

12

Fifteen years ago was a long time.

13

or, excuse me, either he was in his late teens or early

14

twenties when this occurred.

15

And I think that it's just too remote to be probative at this

16

point.

17

And but, besides that, besides that, Your

THE COURT:

I think Mr. Keith was 18

That was a very long time ago.

You know, Mr. Barnes, under the

18

circumstances I might very well rule differently if a copy

19

had immediately been provided to Mr. Little and notice had

20

been provided once you received it, I think I might be more

21

inclined to go along with you.

22

have been provided all the files from all the attorneys.

23

I don't know if that happened or not.

In an ideal world you would
And

That requires a

i

24

certain amount of cooperation from the prior attorneys.

25

I, frankly, don't know if they cooperated.

They have all

And

ptretained counsel.

So, I have no idea.

I have no way of

*\

knowing if they provided you everything that they had.

And

r
3
" so you have that.

What Ifm concerned about, though, is you,

A

obviously, received it a day before.

And it wasn't even

5
presented.

At least the impression that I have had that it

6
wasn't even presented until Mr. Keith was on the witness
7
stand.

And I think that Rule 608(b) is intended to prohibit

8
exactly that type of surprise.

Now, I don't know what Mr.

9
Little would have done differently.

I don't know if he would

10
have done anything differently, because the Rule 609(b)
11
doesn't address notice of the evidence.

It addresses notice

12
of intent to use the evidence.

And so I don't think that the

13
rule requires that the existence of the evidence or the facts
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

be a total surprise to Mr. Little.

I think that what has to

be a surprise for Rule 609(b) to kick in is the intent to use
the evidence.

And had there been, based on what you have

told me, I may very well rule differently, if you had
provided notice of intent to use that as soon as you received
the evidence, but didn't.

And I think Rule 609(b) is

intended to protect against surprise.
Rule 609(b) applies.

And so, I think

So, my ruling in that regard stands.

Regarding 608, I'm troubled by the alternate
interpretations of that rule, because your interpretation
makes sense.

However, the alternate interpretation makes

sense as well that the limiting language of 608 (b) is

intended to exclude from specific instances of conduct
evidence of conviction of a crime.

And that evidence of

conviction of a crime is intended to be dealt with only in
Rule 609.
conduct.

It is not considered to be a specific instance of
Quite frankly, that's the interpretation that makes

the most sense to me is that the limiting language of 608 (b)
is intended to indicate that a specific instant of conduct
that may be inquired into on cross-examination does not
include a conviction of a crime.

That Rule-609 is intended

to relate to convictions of crime.

And that if you are going

to use conviction of a crime thatfs more than ten years old,
you have to notify in writing the adverse party of intent to
use the evidence.

So, my ruling stands.

MR. BARNES:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
Now we have an issue for appeal.

Are we

ready to proceed?
MR. LITTLE:
like.

Your Honor, there is one item I would

I would like to, in my closing, just as demonstrative,

and show this picture of John Bottema when he was 13 years
old.

I don't have a stipulation from counsel to do this.

But I would like to use this in my closing argument.

If I

need to lay foundation for this with the mother or the
father, I could do that.

l
THE COURT:
MR. LITTLE:

Well, Mr. Barnes?
It's not to be entered into evidence.
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Q

Has he changed substantially in the last couple of

ts?

i St
%
%

8

A

Oh, yes.

Q

Okay.

A

We were looking at his photos just about a week ago.

was after we had met with Troy.

He has a photo of a group

of his friends, maybe five or six of them together.
made mention of, Wow, you really look different.

And I have

We talked

about this in a way that I thought I could give him some
^courage.

1

mature.

You know, you are much larger.

You are much more

Hope you can go into this with confidence.

then he pulled out his school I.D. photos.

And so,

And I got to see in

progression, year by year, the change in him.

And I thought it

was substantial enough that you may want to share that.
t*

Q

Okay.

And when did you provide this to our office, the

picture?
A

I believe it was Tuesday.
MR. LITTLE:
THE COURT:

Tuesday or Wednesday.

May I approach, Your Honor?
You may.

BY MR. LITTLE:

1

Q

Are you familiar with that picture9

A

Yes.

Q

Is that the exact photo that you gave us 9

A

It is.

Q

But is it in the same format9
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*A

Um-hmm.

Q

Okay.

Yeah.

Just enlarged.

And that is a picture of what?

Can you describe

gfriat that is a picture of?
A

That's a class photo that was taken during that year.

.They do fall photos and usually spring photos.

And I think

It's the fall photo.
Q

And how do you know it's the fall photo?

A

He's younger than the —

I brought in several for you.

The other one he has his glasses on.

He would have gotten his

glasses later.
Q

And so you can testify that this is your son John?

A

Yes.

Q

And this is when he was 13 years old?

A

Yes.

Q

And you have photos from the school?

A

Yes.
MR. LITTLE:

Your Honor, I would like to offer

State's Exhibit No. 2, I believe it is, into evidence.
THE COURT:

Mr. Barnes?

MR. BARNES:
THE COURT:

No objection.
Exhibit 2 is received.

(State's Exhibit No.

2

was received into evidence.)
MR. LITTLE:
THE COURT:

No further questions, Your Honor.
Cross-examination9
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MR. BARNES:

Yes.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

if* BARNES :
Q

Clarification.

This would be his eighth grade picture;

fs that correct?
A

Yes.
THE COURT:
MR. LITTLE:
THE COURT:

Anything else?
No.
Thank you.

You may step down.

Mr.

Little, your next witness.
MR. LITTLE:
THE COURT:
a minute.

State rests, Your Honor.
Well, I want to excuse the jury for just

There is a prior ruling that I made earlier.

want to clarify it on the record.

I

So, bailiff, if you can

take the jury back into the jury room for just a minute.
(Whereupon, the following proceedings were held in
open court outs ide the presence of the jury.)
THE COURT:

All right.

presence of the court.

The jury is outside the

I had earlier indicated and, quite

frankly, gentlemeri, I thought about it a lot.
read these rules over again.

1

And ]\ have

J

As I was reading them again, I

think that the rul. m g , that the basis for my :ruling that I
want to be on the recc)rd is the one that I gave yesterday.
Although, I think there is some amb iguity.
clearer rul m g

I think the

analysis is that Rul(a 608 does allow that a
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lay be a specific instance of conduct.

And that

^inquired into if probative of truthfulness or
i'Jness in the discretion of the court concerning the
Tjcharacter of truthfulness or untruthfulness.

But I

m
feiieve that Rule 608(b), I donft think a better
:ion of Rule 608 (b) absolutely prohibits conviction
pcrime as a specific instance of conduct.

But my ruling

fends from yesterday.
MR. BARNES:
THE COURT:
MR. BARNES:
THE COURT:
MR. BARNES:
jury is not here.

Thank you, Your Honor.
I!m just changing the basis for it.
It!s understandable.
Thank you.
Your Honor, it's appropriate that the
I would like to make a motion at this

time.
THE COURT:

That's one of the reasons I excused the

jury, so you could make, if you wanted to make a motion you
could outside the presence of the jury.
MR. BARNES:

Yes.

Thank you.

Before making my

motion, Your Honor, I think it would be appropriate if the
state clarified, now having the evidence presented to the
jury, the charges which is set out in the amended
information.

If, as the court is aware, there are certain

dates that are used in the amended information.

The 18th day

of August on the first two counts, and the 21st day of August
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1

1
i
}

j we talked about.

And I don't have no problem with that.

THE COURT:

]

Thank you.

Anything else, Mr. Barnes?

i

MR. BARNES:

i

THE COURT:

\

MR. LITTLE:

No.
Or, Mr. Little?
No.

i

THE COURT:
back.

All riaht.

Then let's have the nurv

Bring the jury back in.
(Whereupon, the following proceedings were held
in open court in the presence of the jury.)
THE COURT:

All right.

The jury is back in the jury

box.
|j

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, during that recess

1
? aid any of you discuss the case among yourselves or with

1
] ^anyone else or with any of the participants?

No one has

Responded in the affirmative.
Mr. Little, I believe you indicated the state has
fjjested; is that correct?
MR. LITTLE:
THE COURT:
MR. BARNES:
THE COURT:

That's correct, Your Honor.
Mr. Barnes?
Your Honor, defense rests as well.
All right.

Thank you.

Well, ladies and

|j|tentlemen, that concludes the presentation of testimony.
ithat we are going to do now, and I apologize for this, we are
KS£ n 9 to send you back into the jury room.

And there are

[j§6me issues we need to resolve with regard to the final
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[would ask the court to dismiss counts two and five at this
ttinie.

And what would be brought before the jury would be

''counts one and counts four.
THE COURT:
apply to this case.

Thank you.

I read Morrison to actually

And the rule against multiplicity

prohibits the government from charging a single offense in
Iseveral counts.

That is intended to prevent multiple

^punishments for the same act.

It's this court's perception

r

that it is not the same act for a perpetrator to have a child

•&uck on his penis and then to suck on the child's penis.
Those are separate acts.

They may have occurred within the

|g same brief time frame, but they are separate acts.
fpfaced with the issue.

I'm not

I'm not ruling on whether or not a

^succession of activity then a resumption within the next five
^minutes would constitute a separate act.
|| court that what is alleged are separate —

It is clear to this
are separate acts

Sand, therefore, the motion to dismiss is denied.

Anything

^ else we need to take care of outside the presence of the
& jury, gentlemen?
MR. LITTLE:

No, Your Honor.

MR. BARNES:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

You each have copies of the court's

remaining ;jury instructions 9 through 18?

I

9$

MR. LITTLE:

Yes.

MR. BARNES:

Yes.

2,5
V®1

I
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